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J. S. GARMON et al., Respondents, v. SAN DIEGO BUILDING TRADES COUNCIL et al., Appellants.
[1] Labor-Federal Boards--Jurisdiction.-The National Labor
Relations Board has exclusive primary jurisdiction to prevent
unlawful demands by labor organization on employer engaged
in interstate commerce.
[2a, 2b] Id.-Picketing.-Where the purpose of picketing and
other economic pressure was to compel a company to sign an
agreement which included a clause requiring the employer to
encourage membership in certain unions, this was an "unfair
labor practice" under the Labor Management Relations Act.
(29 u.s.c. § 158.)
[3] Id.-Federal Boards--Jurisdiction.-The National Labor Relations Board need not accept every controversy of which it
has jurisdiction; it hears and determines controversies only
in connection with enterprises whose operations have, or at
which labor disputes would have, a pronounced impact on
the flow of interstate commerce.
[4] !d.-Remedies--Jurisdiction of State Courts.-The reason for
prohibiting state courts from acting in cases in which the
National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction is to obtain
uniform application of the substantive rules as expressed by
Congress, and to avoid diversities and conflicts likely to result
from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor
controversies.
[5] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-A remedy under federal laws available to an injured party may justify
preemption of the field of labor relations, but when the application of that rule would result in the loss of all protection
there is no reason to bar state courts from providing relief.
[6] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-There is no
conflict of jurisdiction between the National Labor Relations
Board and state courts when the board determines not to
adjudicate the issues arising from a labor dispute.
[7] !d.-Remedies--Jurisdiction of State Courts.-The National
Labor Relations Board's refusal to accept jurisdiction of a
[1] See Am.Jur., Labor, § 145.
[2] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), Labor, § 35 et seq.;
Am.Jur., Labor, § 223 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 9] Labor, § 1a; [2] Labor, § 23,
[ 4-8, 10, 11] Labor, § 24; [12] Labor, § 28.5; [13] Labor, § 20a;
[14] Labor,§ 30.5; [15] Labor, § 28.

658

GARMON

v.

SAN DIEGO BLDG. TRADES CouNCIL [ 45

0.2d

labor dispute on the ground that the issue presented does not
sufficiently affect the national welfare to justify the board's
attention is, in effect, a declaration that the national labor
policy will not be jeopardized if the state assumes jurisdiction.
[8] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-By giving the
National Labor Relations Board discretion to accept or refuse
jurisdiction of a controversy the legislative purpose must
have been to give the state courts jurisdiction when the board
specifically determines that the controversy will not affect
the national economy.
[9] !d.-Federal Boards-Jurisdiction.-The general policy of the
National Labor Relations Board in regard to controversies of
which it will take jurisdiction makes no distinction between
an application to determine representation and one complaining of an unfair labor practice, and a refusal to take jurisdiction of a controversy concerning representation constitutes
a refusal to accept jurisdiction of a complaint against that
employer which charges an unfair labor practice.
[10] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-The TaftHartley Act,§ lO(a) [29 U.S.C. 160(a)], giving the National
Labor Relations Board the power to prevent any person from
engaging in an unfair labor practice when it affects interstate commerce, also empowers the board, by agreement, to
cede jurisdiction of cases affecting such commerce to state
agencies so long as the state law is not inconsistent with the
national labor policy as expressed in the federal laws, but
Congress has not prohibited the state from assuming jurisdiction of conduct which would amount to an unfair labor practice
under the federal law when the board refuses to take jurisdiction.
[11] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-The basis for
refusing to allow a state court to take jurisdiction of a dispute
within the cognizance of the National Labor Relations Board
in advance of action by it is the purpose to avoid a possible
conflict between state policy and that of the board in an area
in which the federal body has not had opportunity to act.
[12] Id.-Remedies-Findings.-In an action against unions to
enjoin picketing and recover damages, findings that the unions
presented a labor agreement to the employer company with
a demand for its signature, followed by picketing and other
activity with the purpose to compel the employer to execute
the agreement although it would be illegal to do so, was a
determination against the unions on their defense that there
was no unfair labor practice because the contract was not
to be signed, and if signed, would not be accepted by the
union unless the employees became members of it.
[13] Id.-Unions-Closed Shop.-A closed shop is a proper labor
objective.
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join
purpose of
picketing was not to induce the employees to
join the unions but was to compel the employer company to
sign the
labor agreement or suffer destruction of
its business will not be disturbed on appeal where there is
ample evidence to support it.
[15] Id.-Remedies-Evidence.-In an action against unions to
enjoin picketing and to recover damages, an award of $1,000
damages against the unions is sustained by testimony that
the employer, as a result of the picketing, was required to
pick up and deliver its products at different yards, incurring
the expense of additional man hours and trucking facilities,
and that at least one prospective purchaser was induced to
purchase materials at another yard because of the union
activities, resulting in the loss of profits at least as great as
the amount of damages awarded.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. ,Tohn A. Hewicker, Judge. Affirmed.
Action against unions to enjoin picketing and to recover
damages. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed.
Todd & Todd, Thomas Whelan, John T. Holt and Clarence
E. Todd for Appellants.
Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye, James W. Archer and Ward W.
Waddell, Jr., for Respondents.
EDMONDS, J.-The Garmons, while engaged in business as
partners under the name of Valley Lumber Company, became
involved in a dispute with union labor organizations. The
appeal is from a judgment which enjoins the unions and their
members from carrying on certain activities and awards damages in the amount of $1,000 against them.
Following a trial, the court made these findings of fact :
Valley Lumber Company is engaged in the business of sell
ing lumber and building materials, and its operations affect
interstate commerce. In the previous year it sold materials
originating and manufactured out of California of a value
exceeding $250,000. None of its employees belong to any of
the defendant unions and none have designated either of them
as a labor representative. The employees have indicated that
they do not desire to join, or be represented by, a union. The
National Labor Relations Board has not certified either of the
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unions &'l the representative of the
and the company
has not recognized any union as such.
The union demanded a labor agreement containing a clause
which would require the company to employ, and continue in
employment, only such persons as are, or immediately become,
members of the defendant unions. 1 The company refused to
execute the agreement, upon the grounds that it would be a
violation of the National Labor Relations Act to do so before
the employees, or an appropriate unit thereof, designated a
union as its collective bargaining agent. Shortly thereafter,
the unions placed pickets at the company's place of business.
The intent of the unions was not to induce the employees
to join one of them, nor to provide education or information as
to the benefits of unionization. The only purpose was to force
the company to execute the agreement or suffer destruction of
its business. In addition to picketing, union agents followed
the company's trucks and threatened persons about to enter its
place of business with economic injury. By this conduct, and
the use of language calculated to instill fear of such injury, the
unions induced building contractors to discontinue their
patronage of the company, with consequent damage to the
business amounting to $1,000.
The National Labor Relations Board, " . . . pursuant to a
policy declared by it, refused to take jurisdiction of the controversy between plaintiffs and defendants for the purpose of
determining whether defendants should be designated as the
collective bargaining representative of the employees of
plaintiffs. ''
Upon these findings a judgment was entered which awards
the company $1,000 damages and enjoins the unions " . . .
from picketing the places of business of plaintiffs, from following the trucks of the plaintiffs, from preventing or attempting to prevent, by means of threats, express or implied, persons
having business with the plaintiffs from entering the premises
of the plaintiffs, from inducing or attempting to induce by
such means potential customers of plaintiffs to refuse to purehase from plaintiffs or to refuse to accept delivery of goods
1
"Pursuant to the terms of Section S(a) (3) of the Labor Manage·
ment Relations Act, 1947, there shall be no limitation of the Employer
as to whom he shall employ, continue in employment, or discharge, except
that every employee listed under Section III, (A) and (B), hereof, not
otherwise excluded, shall be, or shall make application within thirty (30)
!lays, become and remain a member in good standing of Millmen's Union,
r,ocal 2020, of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, or Building Material and Dump Truck Drivers, Local 36.''
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from plaintiffs or in plaintiffs' trucks, and from doing any
other acts tending or intended to injure plaintiffs' business, in
order to compel plaintiffs to execute any contract with the
defendants, or any of them, requiring plaintiffs to discriminate
with respect to conditions of employment by reason of membership, or lack thereof, in any labor organization unless and
until defendants, or any one or more of them, have been
properly designated as the collective bargaining representative
of plaintiffs' employees or an appropriate unit thereof."
The unions contend that jurisdiction of the controversy is
exclusively in the National r_,abor Relations Board. They also
attack the judgment upon the ground that the company did
not exhaust its administrative remedies. Other points presented are: the evidence does not support the findings; the findings do not include all issues tendered; the award of damages
is based upon evidence entirely speculative; and, the record
shows no violation of any state law.
In support of the judgment, the company asserts that the
jurisdiction of the national board is not exclusive, or if it is,
the state court may enjoin unlawful conduct when the board
has declined to act. Another point relied upon is that, regardless of state jurisdiction to enjoin the unions, the superior
court's award of damages for violation of the state's public
policy is not contrary to any federal law.
[1] The National Labor Relations Board has exclusive
primary jurisdiction to prevent unlawful demands. (Weber
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 [75 S.Ct. 480, 99
L.Ed. 546] ; Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers
Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 [74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed.
228]; United Const. Workers v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 347
U.S. 656 [74 S.Ct. 833, 98 L.Ed. 1025] ; Bethlehem Steel v.
New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767, 769 [67
S.Ct. 1026. 91 L.Ed. 1234].) [2a] The purpose of the picketing was to compel the company to sign an agreement which
included a clause requiring the employer to encourage membership in the unions. In the circumstances here shown, under
the Labor Management Relations Act, this was an unfair labor
practice. 2
1
(a) "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer •••
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization. . . ''
(b) "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents ..• (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to
discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3)
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In the Garner case, a Pennsylvania court enjoined
which, contrary to a state statute, was
on for the
purpose of coercing an employer to
or ''influence'·
employees to join the union. The state Supreme Court reversed
the judgment upon the ground that the
sole remed~
was that provided by the National Labor ]',l[anagement Relations Act. (Garner v. Teamsters, 373 Pa. 19 [ 94 A.2d 893]. ·
The United States Supreme Court agreed, holding "that petitioner's grievance fell within the jurisdiction of the National
I.1abor Relations Board to prevent unfair labor practices.... '·
[3] However, the board need not accept every controversy
of which it has jurisdiction. (Haleston Drug Stores v. National Labor Relations Board, 187 F.2d 418. See discussion by
Philip Feldblum, Jurisdictional "Tidelands" in I.Jabor Relations, 3 Labor Law Journal 114.) It hears and determines
controversies only in connection with ''enterprises whose operations have, or at which labor disputes would have, a pronounced impact upon the flow of interstate commerce." (National Board Press release dated October 6, 1950.)
In the present case, the employer's position is that, when
the National Labor Relations Board refuses to take jurisdiction of a dispute because the effect of the company's business
on interstate commerce is not substantial, the state courts may
act. The United States Supreme Court has not decided this
question. In the Garner case it pointed to the lack of any indication that "the federal Board would decline to exercise its
powers once its jurisdiction was invoked." (Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 TJ.S. 485
[74 S.Ct. 161 at 164, 98 L.Ed. 228] .) Later in Building
Trades Council v. J[inm·d Const. Co., 346 U.S. 933 [74 S.Ct.
373, 98 L.Ed 423], in reversing a state court's affirmance of an
injunction on the authority of the Garner case, it said: ''Since
there has been no clear showing that respondent has applied to
the National Labor Relations Board for appropriate relief, or
that it would be futile to do so, the Court does not pass upon
the question suggested by the opinion below of whether the
state court could grant its own relief should the Board decline
to exercise its jurisdiction.''
[ 4] The reason for prohibiting state courts from acting in
cases in which the board has jurisdiction is to obtain uniform
or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership
in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground
other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership . . . . " (29 U.S.C. § 158.)
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of the substantive rules as
by Congress,
and to avoid diversities and conflicts likely to result from a
variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor contron~rsies.
(Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local
L'nion No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 [74 S.Ct. 161, 166, 98 L.Ed. 228].)
[5] A remedy under federal laws available to an injured
party may justify preemption of the field of labor relations,
but when the application of that rule would result in the loss of
all protection, there is no reason to bar state courts from providing relief. [6] There is no conflict of jurisdiction when
the federal board determines not to adjudicate the issues.
[7] Furthermore, a refusal to accept jurisdiction upon the
ground that the issue presented does not sufficiently affect the
national welfare to justify the board's attention, in effect, is a
declaration that the national labor policy will not be jeopardized if the state assumes jurisdiction.
[8] When Congress enacted the applicable statutes, it
must have been aware that an unfair labor practice may affect
management and labor in a small business to the same extent
as in a large industry. The difference is only the effect on the
national labor and economic level. Certainly Congress did not
intend to deprive a business having only a limited effect on
interstate commerce of all protection in a labor-management
controversy. By giving the board discretion to accept or
refuse jurisdiction, the legislative purpose must have been
to give the state courts jurisdiction when the board specifically
determines that the controversy will not affect the national
economy. (Accord: Your Food Stores v. Retail Clerks' Local
No. 1564, 124 F.Supp. 697, 703; Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, W.
& Helpers Local No. 941 v. Whitfield Transportation, Inc.,
-Tex. [273 S.W.2d 857, 860]; but cf.: New York
State Labor Relations Board v. Wags Transp. System, 130
N.Y.S.2d 731; Universal Oar & Service Co. v. International
Assn. of Machinists, 27 C.C.H. Labor Law Reporter 68, 825.)
In the present case, the employer filed a petition for
determination of representation, pursuant to the provisions
of the National I1abor Relations Act. It was informed by letter that ''The amount of business done by Valley Lumber
Company in interstate commerce is insufficient for the Board
to assert jurisdiction on the basis of previous Board decisions."
I1ater, after a careful investigation, the regional director of
the board dismissed the petition. He stated that "in view of the
scope of the business operation involved, it would not effectuate the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act to insti-
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tute further proceedings at this time .... " It appears without conflict that only $250,000 of the company's business during the preceding year was in interstate commerce, either directly or indirectly. In view of the general pronouncement
by the board (Press Releases dated October 6, 1950 and July
14, 1954) that it will exercise jurisdiction only when an "enterprise" has a direct inflow of material valued at $500,000 a
year, or an indirect flow valued at $1,000,000, a request for
review of the Regional Director's action would have been
futile.
[9] The general policy of the board in regard to jurisdiction makes no distinction between an application to determine
representation and one complaining of an unfair labor practice. A refusal to take jurisdiction of a controversy concerning representation constitutes a refusal to accept jurisdiction of a complaint against that employer which charges an
unfair labor practice. In C. A. Braukman, etc. and International Union of Operating Engineers, 94 N.L.R.B. 234, the
board said, ''True, the Board has not heretofore considered
the instant complaint case. However, because the Board does
not, with respect to the question of jurisdiction, differentiate
between representation and complaint cases, we believe that
dismissal of the . . . representation case on jurisdictional
grounds ... was in effect, notice to all parties concerned that
any complaint case based on alleged unfair labor practices ...
would similarly be dismissed." (Also see: National Labor
Relations Board v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141.)
[10] Section 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act (29 U.S.C.
§ 160 (a) ) , gives the board the power to prevent any person
from engaging in an unfair labor practice when it affects interstate commerce. That section also empowers the board, by
agreement, to cede jurisdiction of cases affecting such commerce to state agencies so long as the state law is not inconsistent with the national labor policy as expresesd in the federal laws. But Congress has not prohibited the state from
assuming jurisdiction of conduct which would amount to
an unfair labor practice under the federal law when the board
refuses to take jurisdiction. When jurisdiction is declined by
the board, the legislative mandate that nothing shall affect the
board's power to enforce the act is not infringed upon.
[11] The basis for refusing to allow a state court to take
jurisdiction of a dispute within the cognizance of the board
in advance of action by it is the purpose to avoid a possible
conflict between state policy and that of the board in an
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area in which the federal body has not had an opportunity
to act. "Coincidence" of policy, the United States Supreme
Court has declared, is not sufficient to avoid the danger of
a possible conflict. (Bethlehem Steel v. New York State Labor
Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767, 769 [67 S.Ct. 1026, 91 L.Ed.
1234].) However, if the state court should refuse to assume
jurisdiction when the board has affirmatively declined to act,
one party to the labor controversy might be able to flout the
policy expressed by Congress in the national legislation.
[12] The unions complain of the court's asserted failure
to make a finding on their allegation that there was no unfair
labor practice beeause, as clearly stated, the contract was
not to be signed, and if signed, would not be accepted by the
union unless the employees became members of it. But the
findings that the unions presented the agreement to the company with a demand for its signature, followed by picketing
and other activity with the purpose to compel the employer
to execute the agreement although it would be illegal to do
so, was a determination against the unions upon this defense.
The company argues that the trial court properly gave
both damages and injunctive relief. It relies upon the rule
stated in James v. JJiarinship Corp., 25 CaL2d 721 [155 P.2d
329, 160 A.L.R. 900], that "the object of concerted labor
activity must be proper and that it must be sought by lawful
means, otherwise the persons injured may obtain damages
or injunctive relief." (P.728) They assert that damages
were a proper redress for the injuries previously suffered
from the picketing and concerted activities by defendants
and an injunction is proper to avoid further injury. The
appellants take the position that "the conduct of the labor
union was lawful and proper in the light of both federal and
state law."
[13] One argument is that since the ultimate objective of
the concerted economic pressure was to obtain a closed shop,
which is a proper labor objective under the law of California
(McKay v. Retail Auto Salesmen's Local Union No. 1067,
16 Cal.2d 311, 327 [106 P.2d 373] ; Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union Local 1172, 16 Cal.2d 379, 387-388 [106 P.2d
403] ) , the purpose of the picketing was not ''unlawful'' and
hence not within the rule of the Marinship case. For this
proposition, reliance is placed upon Park & Tilford I. Corp.
v. International etc. of Teamsters, 27 Ca1.2d 599 [165 P.2d
891, 162 .A.L.R. 1426).
The Park & Tilford case concerned an injunction which,
a majority of the court concluded, was broader than that
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allowed by the pleadings and the evidence. There, without
having obtained the requisite majority of employees for the
purposes of collective bargaining, a labor organization picketed and boycotted the employer after demanding of him
that he sign a closed shop agreement with that organization.
An injunction was granted restraining the union from all
interference with the sale or delivery of the plaintiff's products and from all picketing and boycotting of its business.
This relief was too broad, said a majority of the court, although the trial judge was correct in the conclusion that the
demands made by thr; union were unlawful under the National
Labor Relations Act.
The evidence as to the union's conduct, said the court,
did not support the finding that the purpose of the concerted
economic pressure was to compel the employer to violate the
federal law by discriminating as to his employee's choice of
union representation. Instead, it was held, the ultimate
purpose of the economic pressure was to bring about a closed
shop agreement, which would be lawful under both California
law and the controlling federal statutes. The court further
held that, although the federal act made unlawful the employer's signing of such an agreement before a requisite
majority of his employees was obtained by the union, the
statute did not proscribe the assertion of economic pressure
by the unions upon both hi.m and his employees, to compel
their accession to union demands, before the time at which
the employer might lawfully comply with them. This construction of the federal act was based, in part, upon an
analogy made to the Shafer and McKay cases, snpra, in which
quite similar provisions in sections 921-923 of the California
I..~abor Code were construed as protecting employees from
improper employer influence but not as protecting the employer from economic pressure designed to bring about a
closed shop agreement.
Since those decisions, however, the federal statute has been
broadened to extend protection to the employer from such
activities. (29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (2).) [2b] The assertion
of economic pressure to compel an employer to sign the type
of agreement here involved is an unfair labor practice under
section 8 (b) (2) of the act. ( Cf. Great Atlantic &; Pacific
Tea Co. (1949) 81 N.L.R.B. 1052.) Concerted labor activities
for such a purpose thus were unlawful under the federal
statute, and for that reason were not privileged under the
California law. ( Cf. Park &; Tilford I. Corp. v. International
etc. of Teamsters, 27 Cal.2d 599, 604 [165 P.2d 891, 162
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[14]
however, that the purpose of the concerted activities here complained of was to invite the employees to
the union. But the court found that the
purpose of the
was not to induce the employees
to join the unions but to compel the company to sign the
proffered
or suffer destruction of its business.
was intended would require
To hold that a contrary
this court to draw different inferences from thr evidrnce
which amply supports the finding of the trial court.
[15] Finally, it is argued that the evidence does not
support the finding as to the amount of damages. However,
there is testimony that the employer, as a result of the picketing, was required to pick up and deliver its products at
different yards, incurring the expense of additional man
hours and trucking faeilitiPs. The record also shows that at
least one prospective purchaser was induced to purchase materials at another yard because of the union activities, resulting in the loss of profits at least as great as the amount of
damages awarded. This evidence amply supports the judgment insofar as damages are concerned.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, .T., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
In this ease defendant unions were enjoined from peaceful
picketing to organize plaintiffs' employees, have them join
defendants and have def<'mlants as their bargaining representatives; damages were also awarded to plaintiffs for the
picketing. The trial court found that plaintiffs' business
affected interstate commerce. Plaintiffs requested the National r_.abor Relations Board to hold an election to determinr
who should represent their employees. The board dismissed
the proceeding-. The majority opinion holds that the ease
is one in which the board would normally have jurisdiction
and the state court would not, because defendants' activity
was an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.)* but, says
*That is clearly the law. (Weber v. Anhenser·Busch, Inc., 348 U.S.
468 [75 S.Ct. 480, 99 L.Ed. 5461; Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs.
<f Helpers Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 [74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228];
United Canst. Workers v. Laburnum Canst. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 [74 S.Ct.
833, 98 L.Ed. 1025]; Build·ing Trades Council v. Kinard Comt. Co., 346
U.S. 933 [74 S.Ct. 373. 98 L.Ed. 4231.)
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the majority, in this case the state court has
beby
the
cause the board refused to take
representation proceedings and that federal law (Labor Management Relations Act) rather than state law is applicable ;
that under the federal law defendants' conduct
an unfair
labor practice, the picketing was for an unlawful purpose.
Hence defendants were
and damages
awarded against them. In other
the state court is
to enforce the federal law.
Those conclusions are fallacious for the following reasons :
( 1) The national board and the powers
to it are
an integral part of the federal law and that law is not intended
to have application in a situation where the board plays no
part; it is inescapable that the federal law is to be administered by the board, not by the state courts. (2) The board
in refusing jurisdiction as it has power to do, has in effect
determined that the federal law should not apply in this case.
(3) It is neither feasible nor fair to apply the federal law.
( 4) There has not been such a refusal to exercise jurisdiction
by the board here as to justify the conclusion that the state
court has jurisdiction.
Before discussing those points it should be observed that
under our law defendants' activity is lawful and hence neither
damages nor injunctive relief is proper. The majority does
not question this proposition. The rule was stated with the
citation of many supporting authorities in Park & Tilford
I. Corp. v. International etc. of Teamsters, 27 Cal.2d 599, 604
[165 P.2d 891, 162 A.L.R. 1426] : "The closed shop is recognized as a proper objective of concerted labor activities, even
when undertaken by a union that represents none of the
employees of the employer against whom the activities are
directed. (McKay v. Retail etc. Union No. 1067, 16 Cal.2d
311, 319, 322 [106 P.2d 373] ; Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists
Union, 16 Cal.2d 379, 382 [106 P.2d 403] ; C. S. Smith Met.
,7J,Iarket Co. v. Lyons, 16 Cal.2d 389 [106 P.2d 414] ; Sontag
Chain Stores Co. v. Superior Conrt, 18 Cal.2d 92 [113 P.2d
689] ; see Fortcnbury v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.2d 405 [106
P.2d 411] ; Steiner v. Long Beach Local No. 128, 19 Cal.2d
676, 682 [123 P.2d 20]; Emde v. San Joaquin Cmtnty etc.
Council, 23 Cal.2d 146, 155 [143 P.2d 20, 150 A.L.R. 916] ;
Lisse v. Local Union, 2 Cal.2d 312 [ 41 P.2d 314] ; In re Lyons,
27 Cal.App.2d 293 [81 P.2d 190]; J. F. Parkinson Co. v.
Building Trades Cottncil, 154 Cal. 581 [98 P. 1027, 16 Ann.
Cas. 1165, 21 L.R.A.N.S. 550] ; Pierce v. Stablemen's Union,
156 Cal. 70 [103 P. 324].) . . . A union may picket and
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boycott an employer's business with the object of so discouraging public support of the business that the nonunion
workers will face the prospect of the loss of their jobs. . . •
"Picketing and boycotting unquestionably entail a hardship
for an employer when they affect his business adversely. The
adverse effect upon the employer's business that may result
from the competition among workers for jobs is comparable
to the adverse effect on his business that may result from his
own competition with other employers. It is one of the risks
of business. (See C. S. Smith Met. Market Co. v. Lyons,
16 Cal.2d 389, 398 [106 P.2d 414].) 'The law . . . permits
workers to organize and use their combined power in the
market, thus restoring, it is thought, the equality of bargaining power upon which the benefits of competition and free
enterprise rest. Accordingly, the propriety of the object of
workers' concerted activity does not depend upon a judicial
determination of its fairness as between workers and employers.' ( 4 Rest. Torts, p. 118.) . . .
"[I]n Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, supra, the
eourt stated: 'The argument is . . . made that it is absurd
to suppose that these provisions were written with the intention of restraining the employer from influencing his employee, while at the same time conferring upon other individuals the right "to coerce" the same employee through the
employer. But the right of workmen to organize for the purpose of bargaining collectively would be effectually thwarted
if each individual had the absolute right to remain "unorganized,'' and using the term adopted by the appellants to
designate the economic pressure applied against them through
the employer, coercion may include compulsion brought about
entirely by moral force. Certainly such compulsion is not
made contrary to public policy by any statute of this state
!lnd is a proper exercise of labor's rights. (Senn v. Tile
Layers' Union, 301 U.S. 468 [57 S.Ct. 857, 81 L.Ed. 1229];
Lauf v. E. G. Skinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 [58 S.Ct. 578,
82 L.Ed. 372]; Fur Workers' Union No. 72 v. Fur Workers'
Union No. 21238 (1940), 105 F.2d 1, aff'd 308 U.S. 522 [60
S.Ct. 292, 84 !J.Ed. 443].)"
Speaking to the first point, it is clear that the national
board and not a state court is to administer the federal law,
at least in situations involving unfair labor practices. It is
the forum which is to decide what steps, if any, should be
taken to interpret initially the law, to make rules and regulations amplifying the law, to decide what is best for inter-
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state commerce when activity in a labor controversy is claimed
to interfere with it, to maintain uniformity in the treatment
of cases, etc. The stated purpose of the federal law is to
preserve certain rights and protect commerce (29 U.S.C.A.
0 151.) The national board is created and it must report
to Congress on the cases it has heard. (Id., § 153.) It may
make rules and regulations to carry out the act. (Id., § 156.)
Unfair labor practices arc defined. (I d., § 158.) The board
·'shall decide'' ''. . whether, in order to insure to employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization
;:nd to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the
policies of sections 151-166 of this
the unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer
unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.
'' (c) ·whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning the representation of employees, the Board may investigate such controversy and certify to the parties, in writing, the name or names of the representatives that have been
designated or selected." (Id., § 159.) The board " . . . is
empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section
158 of this title) affecting commerce. This power shall not
be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention
that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or
otherwise : Provided, That the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to cede to
such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other
than mining, manufacturing, communications, and transportation except where predominantly local in character) even
though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial statute
applicable to the determination of such cases by such agency
is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this subchapter." (I d., § 160.) If it is charged that an unfair labor
practice is being committed the board "may" issue a complaint and shall deeide the matter; it "may" ask a federal
court for equitable relief in enforcing its decision, and its
decision may be reviewed by a federal court. (Id., § 160.)
Immunity from prosecution is accorded witnesses who are
compelled to testify before the board. (Id., § 161.) These
and many other provisions elearly envision that the federal
law is not to operate without the national board. That proposition was pointed out in Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
& Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 [74 S.Ct.
161, 98 L.Ed. 228 J : "Congress has taken in hand this par-
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ticular type of controversy where it affects interstate commerce. . . . [I] t has forbidden labor unions to exert certain
types of coercion on employees through the medium of the
employer. It is not necessary or appropriate for us to surmise
how the National Labor Relations Board might have decided
this controversy had petitioners presented it to that body.
The power and duty of primary decision lies with the Board,
not with us. But it is clear that the Board was vested with
power to entertain petitioners' gnevance, to issue its own
complaint against respondents and, pending final hearing,
to seek from the United States District Court an injunction
to prevent irreparable injury to petitioners while their case
was being considered. . . .
"Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of
law to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law
generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary
interpretation and application of its ntles to a specific and
specially constitnted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, compla·int and notice, and hearing
and decision, including judicial relief pending a final administrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was
necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive
rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to
result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward
labor controversies. . . . A multiplicity of tribunals and a
diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of
substantive law. The same reasoning which prohibits federal
courts from intervening in such cases, except by way of review
or on application of the federal board, precludes state courts
from doing so. . . . And the reasons for excluding state administrative bodies from assuming control of matters expressly
placed within the competence of the federal board also exclude
state courts from like action.'' (Emphasis added.) And it
is said in Textile Workers Union of America v. Arista Mills
Co., 193 F.2d 529, 533: " 'It is perfectly clear, both from
the history of the National Labor Relations Act and from
the decisions rendered thereunder, that the purpose of that
act was ''to establish a single paramount administrative or
quasi-judicial authority in connection with the development
of federal American law regarding collective bargaining";
that the only rights made enforceable by the act were those
determined by the National I1abor Relations Board to exist
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under the facts of each case; and that the federal trial courts
were without jurisdiction to redress by injunction or otherwise the unfair labor practices which it defined.' " It should
be clear, therefore, that the Labor Management Relations Act
in dealing with unfair labor practices can only be enforced
by the intervention of the national board, and that state
courts are not in a position to apply that law.
In regard to the second point it is settled that the national
board may refuse jurisdiction because interstate commerce
is not sufficiently affected. "Even when the effect of activities
on interstate commerce is sufficient to enable the Board to
take jurisdiction of a complaint, the Board sometimes properly declines to do so, stating that the policies of the Act
would not be effectuated by its assertion of jurisdiction in
that case." (Emphasis added; National Labor Relations
Board v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675,
684 [71 S.Ct. 943, 95 L.Ed. 1284] ; see also Haleston Drug
Stores, Inc. v. National Labor Relahons Board, 187 F.2d 418,
cert. den., 342 U.S. 815 [72 S.Ct. 29, 96 L.Ed. 616]; National
Labor Relations Board v. Atlanta Metallic Casket Co., 205
F.2d 931; National Labor Relations Board v. StoUer, 207
F.2d 305; National Labor Relations Board v. Guy F. Atkinson
Co., 195 F.2d 141; note, 98 L.Ed. 221.) That power necessarily includes the power to determine that the federal law
shall not apply in a particular case. When it refuses to take
jurisdiction in a particular case because commerce is not
affected and the "put·poses of the Act will not be effectuated"
by assertion of jurisdiction it has said that the case is not
one for the application of the federal law and the state court
should not override that decision as it has done in this case.
It is true that the board is given power to cede jurisdiction
to a state agency by agreement with such agency over any
cases in any industry even though such cases may involve
labor disputes affecting interstate commerce tmless, however,
the state's applicable "statute" is "inconsistent" with the
federal act. (29 U.S.C.A. § 160(a).) There has been no
cession here,* but the cession provision indicates that in such
cases the state is in effect applying federal law because there
can be no cession unless the federal and state law are consistent in both wording and interpretation. It thus may be
inferred that the states are to apply the federal law only
\n the situation where the cession requirements are met. In
other situations it is to apply its own law. When we come
*We have neither statute nor agency covering the field.
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to the power of the federal board to refuse jurisdiction, as
distinguished from cession, we find that power is to make
such refu,_<Jal because the board finds or states "that the policies
of the Act would not be effectuated by" the board's assertion
of jurisdiction (emphasis added). (See National Labor Relations Board v. Denver Bldg. & Oonst. Trades Council, supra,
341 U.S. 675, 684; and cases cited 81tpra, together with the
statement in the decision by the regional director in this
particular case as to why jurisdiction was refused.) In other
words, the board has the power under its authority to refuse
jurisdiction-to decide that the "policies" declared by the
provisions of the federal act, shall not apply in a particular
case. The board having made that determination, it follows
that the state court should not apply the federal act where
the board has refused to act. Implicit also in the power
of refusal is the board's conclusion that there is no need
for uniformity of deeision in order that businesses and labor
in interstate commerce will be similarly treated. Moreover
the board having exclusive jurisdiction generally, it also has
exclusive jurisdiction to determine that interstate commerce
is not sufficiently affected for the federal law to operate. The
state court thus has no jurisdiction to decide to the contrary.
Thirdly, it is neither feasible nor fair to apply the federal
taw in this case. We have no agency such as a labor relations
board in this state or anything like it. There are no facilities
for conducting representation elections to determine whether
a union shall be the collective bargaining agent for the employees, a question whieh may be basic in passing upon unfair
labor practice charges. We have no body with the facilities
nor expertness in the field. Our courts are at a disadvantage
in sizing up the national picture-the impact upon interstate
commerce-in deciding such controversies. The courts cannot
make rules and regulations on the subject as may the national
board. They cannot achieve the uniformity that is vital
nnder the federal law, not having available to them, as does
the national board, the nationwide circumstances.
The discrimination which results from the majority holding
is manifest. An employer, although engaged in business affecting interstate commerce, yet not enough in the board's
view to justify taking jurisdiction and applying the federal
law, is essentially a local operator and such business should
have applied to it the state law the same as its competitors
whose business is purely intrastate. There is no rational basis
for discriminating between the two classes of business or the
45 C.2d-22
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employees or unions concerned. Neither has any meaningful
impact on interstate commerce and thus both should be
amenable to the same law-the state lavv governing intrastate
commerce-employer-employee-union relations.
In the foregoing discussion it has been assumed that there
was a refusal by the national board to take jurisdiction of
the case and that such refusal is ground for saying the state
court has jurisdiction. The latter question has not been settled
by the United States Supreme Court. In Garner v. Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, & Helpers Union No. 776, supra, 346 U.S. 485,
488, the court held, as above indicated, that the board had
exclusive jurisdiction but in discussing the question, mentioned that "Nor is there any suggestion that respondents'
plea of federal jurisdiction and pre-emption was frivolous
and dilatory, or that the federal Board would decline to
exercise its powers once its jurisdiction was invoked." In
the later case of Bu1:lding Trades Council v. Kinard Canst.
Co., supra, 346 U.S. 933, the court reversed (in a memorandum
opinion) the state court's (Supreme Court of Alabama) affirmance of an injunction on the basis of the Garner case
and in so doing stated : '' Since there has been no clear
showing that respondent has applied to the National Labor
Relations Board for appropriate relief, or that it would be
futile to do so, the Court does not pass upon the question
suggested by the opinion below of whether the state court
could grant its own relief should the Board decline to exercise its jurisdiction." It was pointed out in the decision
by the Alabama Supreme Court (Kinm·d Const. Co. v. Building Trades Council, S1tpra, [258 Ala. 500] 64 So.2d 400, 402)
that the board had made the general criteria statement, the
same as it did here, as to the cases in which it would take
jurisdiction. I interpret the Kinard case as holding, therefore, that such a general pronouncement as that made by
the board here is not sufficient to show that the board would
refuse to exercise jurisdiction. We have, therefore, the first
question as to whether there has been a sufficient showing
of refusal to exercise jurisdiction in this case, assuming such
refusal would leave the matter open to state action. It would
appear that there is not sufficient showing of refusal here.
Although the regional director mentioned the scope of plaintiffs' business, it may well have been that his investigation
revealed the facts as found by the court, that none of plaintiffs' employees desired representation by the unions and
hence an election would be futile. Also the director said
that no action would be taken at "tltis time" implying that
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a change of conditions might bring a different result or that
the charge of an unfair labor practice, a condition the court
here fouud to exist, might result in board action. While it
may have been that because of the smallness of the business
here involved a representation election would not be ordered
by the board and for the same reason a complaint for unfair
labor practices would not be considered, it would appear that
an effort should be made to have the board take jurisdiction
of the precise question involved in the state court action.
rather than the side issue of representation, before it may
be said the board has refused to assume jurisdiction. That
precise question is whether there has been an unfair labor
practice for which a remedy may be obtained. We said in
In re De Silva, 33 Cal.2d 76, 78 [199 P.2d 6] : "No distinction may be made here because the National Labor Relations
Board had denied the company's petition for certification of
a union representative. By the denial the board did not
divest itself of jurisdiction to determine whether the defendants were committing unfair labor practices affecting interstate commerce which should be enjoined pursuant to the
procedure provided by the act. Its exclusive jurisdiction over
that matter had not been invoked by the plaintiffs."
Furthermore, there is also an insufficiency of a showing
that the board would not act, in that, as pointed out by the
regional director, plaintiffs could have appealed the dismissal
of their representation petition to the national board in Washington, D. C. This they did not do. The dismissal may
have been reversed. "There is no doubt that the administrative remedy is not exhausted where a party fails to appeal
from an administrative decision to a higher tribunal within
the administrative machinery, or, having filed an appeal, fails
to await a determination thereon before his resort to the
courts.'' ( 42 Am.J ur., Public Administrative Law, § 202;
see Woodard v. Broadtvay Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 111 Cal.
App.2d 218 [244 P.2d 467]; 2 Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law,
§ 187.) It is suggested, however, that an appeal would consume an amount of time that would render any remedy from
the board ineffective, and that the criteria statement of the
board above quoted indicates an appeal would be futile.
Neither point has merit.
The delay is one of tbe incidents of the procedure before
the board established by Congress to handle certain labor
controversies. In a situation in which it was held that a
federal court would not enjoin a state court from giving
relief in a case under the Labor Management Relations Act
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and the union had to follow the state action through the state
appellate procedure and then apply to the Supreme Court,
the court stated in regard to the delay caused by following
the state appellate procedure, "Misapplication of this Court's
opinions is not confined to the state courts, nor are delays
in litigation peculiar to them. To permit the federal co uri;.;
to interfere, as a matter of judicial notions of policy, may
add to the number of courts which pass on a controversy
before the rightful forum for its settlement is established. A
district court's assertion of equity power or its denial may
in turn give rise to appellate review on this collateral issue.
There may also be added an element of federal-state competition and conflict which may be trusted to be exploited and
to complicate, not simplify, existing difficulties." (Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Brothers, 348 U.S. 511
[75 S.Ct. 452, 457, 99 L.Ed. 600] .)
The statement of criteria is no more reason to declare that
an appeal to the board would be futile than that it makes
an application to the regional director unnecessary. The
same reasons, that is, that there should be a final determination by the director and board before it can be said the
board has refused to exercise its jurisdiction, apply to the
necessity for an appeal. The board as such has not acted
until an appeal is taken and determined. The essence of
state jurisdiction if the board refuses to act is an unequivocal
final determination by the board that it will not act. Indeed,
the board may on appeal determine that a representation
election, the only thing asked by plaintiffs, is not appropriate
because none of their employees belong or desire to join the
union rather than that the policies of the federal law will
not be effectuated by taking jurisdiction. As heretofore
pointed out, the United States Supreme Court has in effect
held that a general criteria statement is not enough to amount
to a refusal by the board to take jurisdiction. (Building
Trades Council v. Kinard Co11st. Co., sttpra, 346 U.S. 933.)
In the foregoing discussion I have assumed that the majority adheres to the state law as stated in Park & Tilford I.
Corp. v. International etc. of Teamsters, quoted supra, 27
Cal.2d 599, and the many cases there cited, and I trust there
is no thought of overruling those cases without saying so
although it applies the federal law by using the ritual of
unlawful purpose. t However, it is not clearly pointed out
tPicketing for an unlawful purpose may be enjoined under state law;
the purpose here is unlawful under the federal law, and hence enjoinable,
but is lawful under state law and therefore not enjoinable.
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that under our law the purpose of the picketing here involved
is not unlawful or that the court is applying the federal law
only because interstate commerce is affected.
The judgment should be reversed.
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied December
28, 1955. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were
of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
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CHARLES H. BENTON, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent,
v. PAINTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 333 et al., Appellants.
[1] Labor-Federal Boards-Jurisd.iction.-Where an employer's

business affects interstate commerce, in the first instance,
jurisdiction of its controversy with labor unions vests exelusively in the N a tiona! Labor Relations Board.
[2] Id.- Federal Boartls- Jurisdiction.-Where an employer's
petition for a determination of representation was dismissed
by the N a tiona! Labor Relations Board on the ground that
the unions named in the petition did not claim to represent
the unit of employees for which petitioner sought an election,
this was not a refusal to take jurisdiction, but only a declaration that petitioner was not entitled to an election under the
provisions of the statute.
[3] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-A general pronouncement of the National Labor Relations Board that it will
exercise jurisdiction only in cases in which the employer's
business in interstate commerce exceeds a certain minimum
amount is not sufficient automatically to confer jurisdiction
on a state court where an employer's operations do not come
up to that minimum.
[4] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-In an action
against unions to enjoin picketing and to recover damages, the
state court has jurisdiction to award damages to the employer if the evidence shows that it is entitled to them under
state law.
[1] See Am.Jur., Labor, § 145.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 8] Labor, § 1a; [3, 4, 6, 7] Labor
§ 24; [5, 9] Labor,§ 20a; [10] Labor,§ 21.

